Militia Abuses in the Philippines by Ross, James D.
Third World Legal Studies
Volume 9 Police, Security Forces, and Human Rights in
the Third World Article 7
1-7-1990
Militia Abuses in the Philippines
James D. Ross
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Third World Legal Studies by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ross, James D. (1990) "Militia Abuses in the Philippines," Third World Legal Studies: Vol. 9, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls/vol9/iss1/7
MILITIA ABUSES IN THE PHILIPPINES*
James D. Ross**
I. Introduction
Under the administration of President Corazon Aquino, Philippine
military, police and paramilitary personnel have committed numerous and
widespread violations of human rights, including politically-motivated acts
of murder and attempted murder, torture and rape. This paper examines
one facet of this situation, namely, human rights violations by the Citizen
Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU), a militia force.
Deployed largely since late 1988, the CAFGU is a militia formally
attached to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Under government
regulations, CAFGU members are recruited, trained and supervised by
regular military personnel and subject to the military code. The CAFGU
was instituted to replace the discredited Civilian Home Defense Force, an
abusive militia organized by President Marcos. Since their introduction,
CAFGU units have played an increasing role in the government's counter-
insurgency strategy against the armed communist insurgency, the New
People's Army (NPA).
Since assuming the presidency of the Philippines in February 1986,
Corazon Aquino has taken important steps to reestablish democratic
institutions that had been dismantled during the Marcos years. A new
constitution enunciating a broad array of protections of basic rights was
approved by national plebiscite in 1987. Elections for the Senate and
House of Representatives took place in May 1987, followed early in 1988
by elections for provincial and local government posts. The judiciary has
re-exerted its independence and press freedom is generally respected by
the government.
Intransigent social and economic problems, however, have marred the
Aquino administration's overall record. General conditions in the coun-
This is an abbreviated version of Out of Control: Militia Abuses in the Philippines (1990).
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tryside remain essentially unchanged from the Marcos years, and the
government's land reform program, instituted in 1988, has yet to produce
tangible results. Reports of government corruption have plagued the
administration and a number of its programs, including land reform.
Economic growth has barely kept pace with a rapidly rising population.
Amidst these difficulties, the Aquino administration is burdened by a
fractured and rebellious military, a serious communist insurgency and a
dormant, but potentially explosive, Muslim secessionist movement. During
the first week of December 1989, several thousand military personnel
from elite Marine and Scout Ranger units, including some 300 officers,
attempted a military coup. This week-long rebellion, the sixth and by far
the most serious effort to overthrow the Aquino government, left at least
113 people dead.' The coup attempt was led by young Philippine Military
Academy officers and is thought to have been financed in large part by
Marcos loyalists. Politically, the coup attempt reinforced existing concerns
about the military's reliability.
While the government faced military challenges from the right, it has
also continued to fight a deeply-entrenched left-wing insurgency. Since
1969, the New People's Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party
of the Philippines, has waged a military struggle against the Marcos and
Aquino governments.' NPA rebels operate in most of the country's
provinces, conducting guerrilla operations in the countryside and "hit
squad" assassinations in the cities. NPA guerrilla operations include
assaults and ambushes against AFP units and paramilitary groups; the
killing and abduction of persons declared to be "enemies of the people,"
including military personnel and civilians; and armed attacks on public
and private economic targets, such as logging concerns, plantations owned
by multinational corporations, and road construction projects. Since 1988,
the insurgents have suffered setbacks as a result of the government's
1. MANILA CHRONICLE, Mar. 19, 1990.
2. The founding chairman of the CPP, Jose Ma. Sison, says that the NPA operates 60
guerrilla fronts in 65 of the country's 73 provinces. JosE MA. SISON, THE PmIPPNE REvoLUTION:
THE LEADER'S VIw 164 (1989). See also Pam.. DAILY INQUIRER, Mar. 27, 1989. As of March 1988,
the Philippine government estimated that 2056 of all barangays, the smallest political unit and
equivalent to a rural barrio or city neighborhood, were under NPA influence (that is, where at least
50% of local residents are sympathetic to the insurgents). Government of Philippines estimate, cited
in RICHARD KESSLER, REBELLION AND REPRESSION IN THE PHILIPPINES 56 (1989). For this control, the
NPA relies heavily on its "mass base," the NPA's supporters in rural and urban areas who engage
in political work, act as informants or, more typically, provide food and shelter to NPA guerrillas.
Sison places this mass base at 11 million people. SIsoN, supra, at 163. The total population of the
Philippines is approximately 60 million people.
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capture of several high-ranking CPP leaders and the negative publicity
stemming from NPA abuses against non-combatants and from purges
within the NPA ranks.
Human rights abuses by the Philippine military and by paramilitary
groups continue to be an important factor in drawing individuals into the
NPA. Members of so-called civilian volunteer organizations, commonly
known as vigilantes, have been particularly abusive. First organized in
Davao City in 1986 with the encouragement of the military, vigilante
groups spread throughout the Philippines after the breakdown of the
cease-fire between the government and the NPA in early 1987. Vigilante
groups have conducted counter-insurgency operations by themselves as
well as alongside military units. They have committed numerous acts of
killing, torture and illegal arrest against suspected NPA sympathizers,
including members of social activist organizations.3
In July 1988, President Aquino responded to these abuses by ordering
the dismantling of armed vigilante groups. Since then however, not one
major vigilante group has been dismantled and efforts to disarm groups
have been ineffectual. Military resistance and inadequate governmental
initiative appear to be the primary obstacles to the implementation of this
policy. Furthermore, the government has done little to prosecute vigilantes
who have committed abuses.
Widespread public concern also focused on the Civilian Home Defense
Force, a militia force organized during the Marcos years, whose name
became synonymous with brutality. Although the 1987 Constitution and
a subsequent executive order called for the dissolution of the CHDF, the
military continued to deploy this abusive force in counter-insurgency
operations. Beginning in 1987, the government began replacing the CHDF
with a new militia to assist the armed forces - the Citizen Armed Force
Geographical Unit, known as the CAFGU. This program was fully un-
derway by late 1988.
The CAFGU was designed to replace the CHDF, in lieu of a more
costly expansion of the regular army. Explicitly recognizing the abusiveness
of the CHDF, the government's CAFGU program was created to develop
a militia that would adhere to human rights standards. The program calls
for the careful recruitment and screening of CAFGU members, the for-
malized training of CAFGU recruits, and the supervision of all active
duty CAFGU personnel. According to a report by the U.S. State De-
3. See generally, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR Hu AN RIGHTS, VIGILANTES IN THE PHILIPPINES:
A THREAT TO DEMOCRATIC RULE (1988) [hereinafter VIGILANTES IN THE PHILIPPINES].
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partment, "the ability of the Government to implement policies designed
to ensure full respect for human rights by the CAFGU's will largely
depend upon the Government's ability to successfully fulfill these screen-
ing, training and control functions." '4
CAFGU militiamen have been involved in numerous serious abuses of
human rights. The safeguards designed to keep abusive individuals from
joining the CAFGU have been ignored, circumvented and purposely
disregarded by the military personnel whose responsibility it is to enforce
them. Training of new recruits has been haphazard and inadequate.
CAFGU members have committed abuses while under military supervision
or while left to operate on their own, often in the company of armed
vigilante groups. As with regular military personnel, the government has
rarely taken action to prosecute CAFGU militiamen implicated in human
rights abuses.
II. Precursors to the CAFGU
The Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit is the latest in a series
of militia organized by the Philippine government since the Second World
War. The human rights records of its forerunners are problematic at best;
in the case of its immediate predecessor, the Civilian Home Defense Force
(CHDF), it is egregious. But past experiences with militia forces have by
no means settled the debate over the CAFGU program. Critics of the
CAFGUs bolster their argument by pointing to the historical record,
particularly that of the CHDF. CAFGU supporters, finding models in
Malaysia and Thailand for the use of militia in fighting insurgencies, have
sought to show that the lessons of the past are instructive in developing
a militia respectful of human rights.
A. Militia Forces in the Philippines
Since independence in 1946, the Philippine government has organized
various militia forces to maintain control in often hard-to-reach barrios
throughout the far-flung archipelago. In the late 1940s the Philippine
government created the Civilian Guards to combat the rebellious Huk-
balahap (the "Huks"), an agrarian Marxist insurgency that grew from
guerrilla units that had fought the Japanese occupation. The Huks were
defeated in the early 1950s, largely as a result of a counter-insurgency
strategy that capitalized on mistakes by the Huks themselves and because
4. U.S. DEP'T ST., CITIZENS' SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS IN THE PMLIPPINES 12 (Apr. 28, 1989).
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of social and economic reforms initiated by President Ramon Magsaysay.,
In the early years of the campaign against the Huks, the Civilian Guards
developed a reputation for brutality in their treatment of the civilian
population. Only after President Magsaysay instituted a disciplinary pro-
gram was there some measure of success in curbing Civilian Guard abuses. 6
In the 1960s, the government organized the Barrio Self-Defense Units.
By the end of the decade, then-President Marcos replaced the Barrio Self-
Defense Units with the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF),
organized nationally. In 1976, the ICHDF was enlarged by presidential
decree to include the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), which
previously had not been under the control of the central government and
hence not "integrated." As the NPA insurgency widened and martial law
provided additional powers to the military, the CHDF role in maintaining
law and order in the countryside similarly expanded, with disastrous
results.
B. The Civilian Home Defense Force
The CHDF was designed to serve as an armed civilian force auxiliary
to the Philippine Constabulary (PC), the branch of the armed forces that
plays the leading role in the military's counter-insurgency efforts.7 Under
the formal structure of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, recruitment,
training and supervision of the CHDF was the responsibility of the PC.
In practice there was little control over the militia, whose members
typically were distributed weapons and then set loose to combat the
insurgents. According to Lt. Col. Victor Corpus, one result of the use of
the CHDF as a military force was to provide an easy source of weapons
and ammunition for the NPA insurgents.8
5. See RICHARD KESSLER, REBELLION AND REPRESSION IN THE PHILIPPINES 29-35 (1989); STANLEY
KARNOW, IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA'S EMPIRE IN THE PHILIPPINES 346-55 (1989); RAYMOND BONNER,
WALTZING WITH A DICTATOR 34-38 (1987). For detailed accounts of the Huk rebellion from different
perspectives, see BENEDICT KERKVLIET, THE HUK REBELLION: A STUDY OF PEASANT REVOLT IN THE
PHILIPPINES (1977); and WILLIAM POMEROY, THE FOREST (1974).
6. Kessler, supra note 5, at 34.
7. The PC evolved from a law enforcement agency established by American colonial authorities
in 1901. It subsequently underwent several transformations, including its merger in 1950 with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. In 1975, President Marcos created the Integrated National Police,
which was merged with the PC. In January 1991 the Integrated National Police merged with the PC
to form the Philippine National Police under the control of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government.
8. VICTOR CORPUS, SILENT WAR 119-21 (1989).
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The CHDF was implicated in numerous human rights abuses during
the Marcos years. 9 One of the most widely publicized cases involved the
brutal murder by a CHDF group of an Italian missionary, Father Tullio
Favali, in April 1985 in Mindanao. In 1987, eight CHDF members were
convicted for the murder of Father Favali and sentenced to life impris-
onment. 10 CHDF militiamen under the supervision of the PC were also
responsible for the killing of twenty sugar workers and the wounding of
twenty-four more during a demonstration at Escalante, Northern Negros
province in September 1985."
The dismantling of the CHDF became an important rallying cry of
the opposition to President Marcos. The constitutional commission assem-
bled by President Aquino added a clause in the new constitution that
specifically provided for the dissolution of the CHDF. 12 During the period
that President Aquino retained legislative powers prior to the first session
of the new Congress, she promulgated legislation to give effect to the
constitutional proviso. Executive Order No. 275, promulgated in 1987,
ordered that "all paramilitary units, including the CHDF, shall be dis-
solved within one hundred eighty days from the effectivity [sic] of this
Executive Order."' 3 The executive order called for the Secretary of Na-
tional Defense to supervise the dissolution of all paramilitary units and
the orderly turn-over of all government properties (such as weapons) in
the possession of these units. 4
The military high command's initial response was to assist at least in
the reduction, if not the dismantling, of the CHDF, which by 1987 had
9. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, "SALVAGING" DEMOCRACY: HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE PHILIPPINES 32-43 (1985) [hereinafter "SALVAGING" DEMOCRACY]; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PHILIPPINES: A COUNTRY IN CRISIS 26-30 (1983); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 11-28 NOVEMBER
1981, (Aug. 1982).
10. See "SALVAGING" DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 71-72; VIGILANTES IN THE PHILIPPINES,
supra note 3, at 82. There are only two other convictions of CHDF members for human rights
offenses since President Aquino assumed office. In an October 30, 1986 decision upheld by the
Supreme Court on November 23, 1988, two CHDF members were convicted for the December 26,
1983 murders of Jose Galope and his son Edgardo Galope, suspected NPA members, in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon. See Philippines v. Desiderio Aliocod and Flaviano Dairo (Sup. Ct., Nov. 23, 1988).
Fearing retribution, the family of the victim in the third case, occurring in Leyte, asked that the case
not be publicized.
I1. See "SALVAGING" DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 39-41.
12. "All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces ... shall be dissolved
or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force." PHIL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 24.
13. Exec. Order No. 275 (July 15, 1987). The Executive Order took effect 30 days after the
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. Id. § 8.
14. Id. § 2.
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grown to some 73,000 members." High-ranking military officials con-
cluded that the CHDF had become more of a burden than an asset in
fighting the insurgency because the NPA was able to capitalize on the
militia's abuses.' 6 Even prior to the executive order, then Chief of Staff,
Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, removed thousands of militiamen from the ranks
of the CHDF. These reportedly included some of the CHDF's most
abusive members. As the intensity of the war with the NPA returned to
Marcos-era levels, efforts to dismantle the CHDF slowed significantly.
Many of the dismissed CHDF members kept their weapons and joined
the newly-formed vigilante groups that were being organized throughout
the country. In Mindanao, individuals would operate as CHDF members
by day and armed Tadtad cultists by night. In Davao City, newly-inducted
CHDF members were being trained in weapons use and counter-insurgency
tactics to be deployed as the armed component of the Alsa Masa vigilante
group. By October 1988, nine months after the deadline for their disso-
lution set by Executive Order No. 275, there were still an estimated 40,000
active CHDF members in the country. 7
Throughout this period, CHDF members remained under the formal
command structure of the Philippine Constabulary or the Army, but in
practice this command structure was very nebulous. Individual CHDF
units might be given a free rein by the military to conduct counter-
insurgency activities while other units might be under tight control. Neither
approach, however, seemed to prevent the CHDF from committing serious
human rights violations or lead to the punishment of CHDF members
implicated.
The Philippine military's open resistance to dismantling the CHDF
ended with the full-scale implementation of the CAFGU program since
mid-1988. Still this process has occurred gradually - generally, individual
CHDF units were disbanded only after a CAFGU unit was organized to
fill its predecessor's place.
III. Establishment of The CAFGU
In January 1988, General Fidel Ramos, then retiring as Chief of Staff
to become National Defense Secretary, announced plans to abolish the
CHDF by July 1988 and replace it with a new militia force, the Citizen
15. Kessler, supra note 2, at 120.
16. See, e.g., Brig. Gen. Mariano Baccay, Jr., (Far East Broadcasting Co. (Manila) broadcast,
Jan. 1, 1989), as reported in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (FBIS) (Jan. 5, 1989).
17. See Sicam, CAFGU, Same dog, Different Collar, MANILA CHRON., Oct. 25, 1988.
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Armed Force Geographical Unit. 8 First articulated during the debates
over the post-Marcos Philippine Constitution, the CAFGU proposal flour-
ished with the civilian head of the military as its chief proponent.
A. The Formal Basis
The CAFGU program has its legal basis in three documents: the
Philippine Constitution, Executive Order No. 264 of 1987, and in regu-
lations promulgated by the Department of National Defense. The 1987
Constitution provides for "a citizen armed force which shall undergo
military training and serve, as may be provided by law."' 19 Article XVIII,
the so-called "transitory provision," states: "All paramilitary forces in-
cluding Civilian Home Defense Forces not consistent with the citizen
armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where
appropriate, converted into the regular force." 20 Thus the Constitution's
prohibition against paramilitary forces does not on its face proscribe the
CAFGU program.
President Aquino, using the legislative powers available to her prior
to the convening of the new congress, on July 25, 1987 signed Executive
Order No. 264, "Providing for a Citizen Armed Force." The order
provides for the establishment of a civilian reserve force, based by
territory. Under the executive order, this force is to consist primarily of
citizens who have undergone military training, who shall be subject to
"mobilization as the need arises," and who, upon being called to active
duty, will "serve with the regular troops as part of the standing force."'"
The primary guiding document for the program is the "Implementing
Rules and Regulations to Executive Order Nr. 264 Dated July 25, .1987"
(the CAFGU regulations). It was drafted by the Department of National
Defense and signed by President Aquino on June 7, 1988. The CAFGU
regulations provide for the "development, organization, manning, train-
ing, mobilization and utilization of the Citizen Armed Force." They
devote significant attention to factors that were often ignored in the
organization and deployment of the CHDF, specifically recruitment and
screening, training, and military supervision. 22
18. See speech of outgoing Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Manila, Jan.
26, 1988.
19. PHIL. CONST. art. XVI, § 4.
20. PHIL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 24 (emphasis added).
21. Exec. Order No. 264, "Providing for a Citizen Armed Force" (July 25, 1987).
22. See generally DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
TO EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 264 DATED JULY 25, 1987 (June 7, 1988) [hereinafter CAFGU REGULATIONS].
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The military makes a formal distinction between the CHDF and
CAFGUs.23 Under the regulations, CAFGU members are treated like
soldiers and are covered by the articles of war and armed forces regula-
tions. CAFGUs, like CHDF militiamen, are volunteers, but the former
lose their civilian status, becoming members of a military organization.
As a result, they may be tried by military courts martial. CHDF members
were always considered civilians and not subject to armed forces regula-
tions.24
B. The Public Debate
Much of the public discussion over the CAFGU program has concerned
the relative advantages of organizing a civilian armed force versus increas-
ing the size of the regular army. The intensity of this debate was heightened
both by the poor human rights record of its CHDF predecessor and by
military reports of increasing NPA killings in both urban areas and the
countryside.
According to the CAFGU Primer, prepared by the military, the AFP
organized the CAFGU "to provide a base" for the expansion of the AFP
in case of imminent threat of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or war.25
Furthermore, the CAFGU is to assist government forces in the "mainte-
nance of local security, law and order," assist relief efforts during
calamities, and "assist in socio-economic development, operation and
maintenance of essential government or private utilities in furtherance of
over-all mission.' '26 Despite these multiple functions, Defense Secretary
Ramos has stated that the CAFGU will be gradually abolished as soon
as all barangay have been cleared of NPA insurgents.27
23. Formally, a CAFGU is a reserve unit of the Philippine military organized within a certain
locality. This unit consists of soldiers and officers of the regular military and "qualified reservists
residing in the locality." CAFGU members are of two basic types. The CAFGU Inactive, which the
regulations say make up the "great majority" of CAFGUs, are qualified personnel maintained on
an inactive status. The CAFGU Active Auxiliary are volunteers called upon to complement operations
of the regular AFP forces in its locality. The latter are the militiamen who in common parlance are
known as CAFGU members or, simply, CAFGUs. By a military order promulgated in April 1989,
there is a sub-category known as the Special Active Auxiliary, composed of active personnel paid by
a private employer.
24. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, CAFGU PRIMER 6 (undated) [hereinafter CAFGU
PRIMER]; see also Ask the President (statement of Chief of Staff Renato de Villa) (Quezon City
Radyo ng Bayan broadcast, May 7, 1989), as reported in FBIS 41 (May 10, 1989).
25. CAFGU PRIMER, supra note 24, § 2.
26. Id.
27. MANILA CHRON., Mar. 19, 1990.
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The AFP contends that a militia provides a more cost-effective use of
resources than would expanding the size of the regular army.28 Secretary
Ramos told a Senate committee that the relative low cost of a CAFGU
unit compared to a regular AFP unit was a "very major factor" in the
decision to establish the militia.29 Department of National Defense sources
said the government spends approximately 23 million pesos a year to
maintain a regular army battalion (500 to 600 officers and men), while a
CAFGU battalion costs only six million pesos a year.3 0
A primary task of the CAFGU is to assist the military in combatting
the NPA. According to the Primer, in counter-insurgency operations, the
CAFGU "forms part of the territorial forces that help hold and consol-
idate an area which has been cleared by maneuver or mobile forces."',
CAFGUs "are necessary in the HOLD and CONSOLIDATE phases of
the new counter-insurgency strategy. Without them, we would tie down a
large number of regular AFP for the defense of liberated barangays. "32
Armed forces Chief of Staff Gen. Renato de Villa has emphasized
tasks the CAFGU can perform that do not require the use of more costly
regular army personnel. He stated that CAFGUs could provide a static
defense in areas cleared of NPA rebels by regular forces. According to
de Villa, "The situation on the ground is that we do not have the numbers
to secure the areas we clean up as we go on to chase the enemy. Sooner
or later, they return to the communities we liberated. It is a cat-and-
mouse game." 3
Some military commanders have stressed the intrinsic value of having
soldiers knowledgeable about the communities and terrain in which they
are operating. They also note the value of additional forces who can free
up regular soldiers from static tasks such as guard duty. In support of
the CAFGU, Defense Secretary Ramos has argued that "the best form
of community defense is that which comes from the community itself. ' 34
28. CAFGU PRIMER, supra note 24, § 21.
29. MANNA CHRON., Sept. 2, 1989.
30. MANNA BULL., Mar. 6, 1989. The CAFGU PRIMER states that the government will spend
only about 6,885 pesos per year for every active CAFGU member as compared to 31,560 pesos per
year for every regular private in the AFP or patrolman in the Integrated National Police. CAFGU
PRIE R, supra note 24, § 21.
31. CAFGU PRIMER, supra note 24, § 20.
32. Id. § 23.
33. Pim. FRE PRsus, Apr. 1, 1989.
34. Pim. DA IY GLoBE, Apr. 25, 1989. The U.S. State Department cites two additional reasons
given by the Aquino government for the establishment of a new militia rather than enlarging the
AFP's regular forces. These are the belief that a militia could be more easily disbanded once the
communist insurgency has been defeated, and the desire to involve individual citizens more actively
in their own protection and welfare. See U.S. DEP'T ST., supra note 4, at 9.
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Since their introduction, CAFGUs have played a prominent role in
counter-insurgency operations, conducting a myriad of tasks. They have
participated in offensive operations, joined military patrols acting as
guides, undertaken static defenses in barrios, manned check-points and
stood guard duty at government installations and private economic enter-
prises. Current AFP strategy calls for CAFGU units to "help hold and
consolidate an area which has been cleared [of insurgents] by maneuver
or mobile forces. ' '35
The extensive use of CAFGUs in combat situations is reflected in the
high number of casualties during the past two years. According to AFP
Vice Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Rodolfo Biazon, more than 50 percent of
total government casualties in the counter-insurgency campaign in 1990
were CAFGU militiamen. 36 According to Philippine Army Chief of Staff,
Maj. Gen. Guillermo Flores, "the number of militiamen being killed in
the war in Mindanao is increasing and has even surpassed the casualty
figures for the regular members of the Armed Forces. 3 7 He further
testified that "70% of the encounters in Mindanao are being led by
CAFGUs and more of them have been killed than the regular troops. '3
Casualties among CAFGU forces have been so high that Maj. Gen.
Biazon has criticized military commanders for using the militia in roles
intended for the regular army. He said that there had been a reversal of
roles, in which the regular forces have become a stationary force and the
CAFGU are being sent on protracted patrol missions.39 CAFGU forces
placed in difficult combat situations for which they were neither intended
nor trained are more likely to commit human rights violations.
35. CAFGU PRIMER, supra note 24, § 20.
36. Manila Broadcasting Co. broadcast, June 22, 1990, as reported in FBIS, 58-59 (June 25,
1990); see also MALAYA, May 21, 1990.
37. Testimony of Maj. Gen. Guillermo Flores before Congressional Davide Commission, Apr.
19, 1990, reported in the PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Apr. 20, 1990. Half of the patients at the Southern
Command Hospital in Zamboanga City are CAFGUs.
38. Id. The high number of CAFGU casualties may reflect a number of factors: the use of
CAFGUs by the military in high-risk situations, such as in lightly defended outposts or as point-
men, casualties resulting from the much shorter training period given CAFGU personnel and their
lack of experience, the older and poorer quality weapons generally given CAFGU recruits, and lower
quality leadership provided to CAFGU recruits as compared to regular army units. These factors
might not only increase the number of CAFGU casualties, but also make CAFGU units more likely
targets of attack by NPA or MNLF insurgents.
39. Manila Broadcasting Co. broadcast, June 22, 1990, as reported in FBIS 58-59 (June 25,
1990).
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Chief of Staff Gen. de Villa stated that one purpose of the CAFGU
was to deter the formation of other armed groups, such as vigilantes. 40
But the CAFGU is explicitly not intended to be a replacement for the
vigilante groups, officially-termed "civilian volunteer organizations." From
its inception, the CAFGU, along with the police and the Philippine
Constabulary, was to be the second tier of a "three-layer force" deployed
to combat the insurgency. The first layer consists of "civilian volunteer
organizations," while the third layer is the mobile force of the army and
other AFP units.4'
In 1988, an executive branch request for appropriations forced the
CAFGU debate into the public arena, but the administration's decision
to implement the program had been taken without congressional author-
ization. Initial training and deployment of units took place months before
Congress authorized funds. Approximately 264 million pesos was report-
edly taken from the executive branch's discretionary fund to get the
program underway after the promulgation of the CAFGU regulations.4 2
In late 1988, the Aquino administration submitted a supplementary
budget request of 585 million pesos for the CAFGU. When three senators
expressed reservations about the proposed budget at a committee hearing,
Secretary Ramos responded that a failure to organize the militia imme-
diately would "prolong the protracted war" against the NPA, adding,
"What we need is a war of quick decisions." ' 43 During the debate over
the 1989 budget, the Philippine military announced that it wanted to train
80,000 CAFGU militiamen." As of April 1990, the military reported that
there were about 60,000 CAFGUs operating nationwide of a projected
1990 strength of between 70,000 to 75,000. 41
While Congress approved funding for the CAFGU, the program itself
has never been legislated. Senate President Protempore Teofisto Guingona
Jr. and Senator Wigberto Tanada, chairman of the Committee on Justice
and Human Rights, have introduced an alternative program for a citizen
armed force, which differs substantially from the program being imple-
40. Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan broadcast, Dec. 9, 1988, as reported in FBIS 55 (Dec. 9,
1988).
41. MANiLA BULL., Apr. 26, 1988.
42. MANILA STANDARD, Nov. 21, 1988.
43. MANNA CHRON., Dec. 13, 1988.
44. PstL. DAmY GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1989. Ask the President, (Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan
broadcast, May 7, 1989) as reported in FBIS, May 10, 1989, at 41.
45. MANA Tmis, May 20, 1990. In its budget request for 1990, the military had set CAFGU
strength at 62,000.
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mented. For example, it does not envision the use of civilian armed force
members in counter-insurgency activities." To date, this bill has not made
significant progress through the legislature.
Congress authorized funding for the CAFGU over several constitu-
tional objections to the program. First, the constitutional proviso permit-
ting a Citizen's Armed Force when "provided by law' 47 invalidates the
CAFGU regulations, which were promulgated by the Aquino administra-
tion in June 1988 without the passage of an enabling law." Second, as
noted above, the recruitment and training of civilian volunteers was well
underway before Congress budgeted funds to the program. 49 Third, Ex-
ecutive Order No. 264 was so vague that it delegated too much power to
the National Defense Secretary for the implementation of the CAFGU
program. 0 Fourth, Executive Order No. 264 permits the executive to call
up reservists any time in the future without the authorization of Congress,
in violation of Congress's constitutional power to enact legislation."
Congress may have relied on some of these constitutional objections
in deciding to reduce the government's request for funding, although the
demands of a tight budget may have been determinative. None of these
arguments has been tested in the courts, although opponents of the
program have privately considered doing so. For the time being at least,
the continuation of the CAFGU program appears settled both politically
and as a matter of law.
IV. Recruitment and Screening of CAFGUs
The debate over the recruitment and screening of CAFGU personnel
has been sharpened by an awareness of the widespread lawlessness of the
CHDF militia. CHDF recruitment requirements had not been stringent
and acceptance rarely required more than the approval of the applicant's
barangay captain. Virtually any aspirant to the CHDF who was not
considered politically suspect by the local authorities could get a weapon,
46. See Senate Bill No. 845.
47. Pn.. CON T. art. XVI, § 4.
48. MANI IA Cs RON., Nov. 2, 1988.
49. Id. See also, About time we do away with CAFGU, MAN.A CHnoN., Apr. 28, 1989. In
January 1989, National Defense Secretary Ramos announced that 986 CAFGU companies had been
organized in 1988 - clearly an exaggeration but evidence that the program was fully under way at
the time of the budget debate.
50. EvEmrNo STAR, Oct. 15, 1988.
51. For a fuller constitutional analysis of the basis of the CAFGU program, see Rene Sarmiento,
"On CAFGUs," ConCom Spirit of 1986, June 12, 1989.
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the most difficult requirement being a willingness to join patrols into
NPA-controlled territory. The ranks of the CHDF included criminals, ex-
convicts, members of violent quasi-religious sects and the bodyguards of
powerful politicians and landowners - as well as law-abiding individuals
who found new power carrying a weapon. Those who had been rejected
by the regular army because of their background, or who wanted an army
life without its discipline, were especially likely to join.52
While a number of factors contributed to the abusiveness of the
CHDF, the military's failure to implement an effective recruitment and
screening policy was among the most important. The Philippine govern-
ment has made standardized recruitment and screening procedures an
integral part of the CAFGU program. These procedures - and their
effectiveness in practice - are addressed in this section.
A. Formal Requirements
Under the 1987 CAFGU regulations, the Department of National
Defense provided a set of qualifications and disqualifications for accep-
tance into the CAFGU. Those eligible for the militia include graduates
of Citizen Military Training (a mandated high school training program)
who have been issued orders as reservists, graduates of basic military
training, and honorably discharged ex-servicemen. 1
In areas where there is "an insufficient number of reservists" for
active duty, the AFP will screen qualified and able-bodied male citizens
from the area and provide CAFGU training. As qualified reservists, they
then are eligible for induction.5 4 This exception is significant because it
extends recruitment to individuals who previously have had no military
training. It is also likely to be applied in remote areas where military
activity is greatest, putting such recruits in the most difficult situations.
The regulations provide for certain disqualifications from militia serv-
ice. Individuals are disqualified for being "physically and mentally unfit,"
presently residing abroad, having been convicted of criminal offenses, or
having "derogatory records."" These terms are not defined in the CAFGU
regulations, which state only that the qualification standards are to be
prescribed in an "AFP circular."
52. See "SALVAGING" DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 34-35.
53. See CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, § 2(f). Also eligible are recognized World War
II guerrillas with honorable discharges, officers under Affiliated Reserve Category, National Defense
College of the Philippines graduates and officers in present AFP rosters. Id.
54. Id. § 9.
55. Id. § 7.
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The CAFGU Primer, which is meant to provide basic guidance on
the program, has looser standards. It does not disqualify applicants with
"derogatory records," but only for having a "criminal record." Indivi-
duals with derogatory or abusive backgrounds - but who have no criminal
record - can legitimately be inducted into the CAFGU based on the
qualifications set out in the Primer.5 6 The AFP circular mentioned in the
CAFGU regulations,5 7 which provides "the operational guidelines for the
development, organization, manning and utilization of CAFGUs," also
contains no prohibition against recruiting individuals with "derogatory
records.""8 Given the paucity of convictions for human rights offenses in
the Philippines, this is a serious loophole.
As volunteers, CAFGUs receive no compensation for their services
except medical benefits and the small military food allowance provided
regular soldiers. AFP Vice Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Rodolfo Biazon has
stated that militiamen should have regular jobs because the government
only provides meal allowances. 9 However, there is no employment re-
quirement in the regulations. CAFGUs are reportedly required to have an
alternative source of income in some areas, and it was not possible to
verify whether such a requirement was being enforced. 60
B. Recruitment and Screening in Practice
There are troubling gaps in CAFGU recruitment and screening prac-
tices, as these are undertaken by the AFP. Many of the problems appear
to result from ineffectual enforcement of existing CAFGU regulations.
These include lax background checks on applicants, recruitment by group
instead of by individual, and forced recruitment. More disturbing are
56. See CAFGU PRIMER, supra note 24, § 8.
57. Letter of Instruction (LOI) 16-88 (Tanggol-Bayan Bravo) (July 16, 1988).
58. LOI 16-88 lists the following CAFGU qualifications:
a. volunteer reservists
b. reservists who are law-abiding citizens to include retired officers and EP [enlisted
personnel]
c. bona fide residents of the community
d. sound mind and body
e. physically fit for combat duty
f. unquestionable loyalty to the Republic
g. no criminal record
59. Manila Broadcasting Co. broadcast, June 22, 1990, as reported in FBIS 59 (June 25, 1990).
60. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with Gen. (ret.) Jesus Hermosa, in Cebu
(Aug. 29, 1989).
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recruitment practices where supervising military personnel negligently or
knowingly recruit individuals with records of abuse, including criminals
and ex-convicts, vigilante group members and leaders, and unqualified
CHDF personnel. Lastly, there are recruitment practices wholly within
the letter of the regulations but which are likely to lead to serious human
rights violations.
1. General Practices
The procedure for joining the CAFGU appears to vary from one
locality to the next. In many areas, approval from the local military
detachment is all that is necessary to join. In others, applicants are
required to obtain some kind of recommendation, most often from a
barangay captain or a local civilian official, such as the mayor. In parts
of Agusan del Sur province, candidates in a particular barangay are placed
on a stage, where their membership is voted on by local residents.6' Often
recruitment procedures are mere formalities, such as in Northern Samar
where clearance can be had from a local official for the ten peso
government tax for an official receipt. The regulations provide for appli-
cants to be mentally as well as physically fit, but there is no evidence
that mental fitness for duty is being checked seriously.
Because basic recruitment policies are not standardized and are often
very informal, government oversight of recruitment practices is difficult
if not impossible. This has proven especially true for local officials who
seek to keep track of newly-inducted CAFGU members. The regulations
provide that the Peace and Order Councils in cities and towns "shall be
consulted in the screening of volunteers to the CAA [CAFGU Active
Auxiliaries]." 62 According to a priest in Zamboanga del Sur, mayors in
the region expressed concern that the military was keeping them in the
dark about recruitment practices and were not sure whether there were
established procedures. 63 According to a press report, in March 1989
President Aquino herself relayed the concerns expressed by a group of
mayors from across the country that recruits were being admitted without
the input of the Peace and Order Councils." In Samar, a local government
official believed that vague recruitment procedures made it easier for the
61. See Statement of Rep. Pedro Romualdo, Hearings of the House Committees on Human
Rights, Local Government and National Defense, Mar. 14, 1989.
62. CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, § 12.
63. Interview by Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, in Pagadian City (Aug. 29, 1989).
64. See MALAYA, Mar. 1, 1989.
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military to circumvent "uncooperative" civilian officials. 65 Furthermore,
all records and lists of CAFGU members are kept with the local military
unit;" unless the government official is in the good graces of the local
military commanders, access to such records can effectively be barred.
The government's image of the CAFGU militiaman as a "part-time"
soldier ignores the realities of barrio life in the Philippines today. The
Manila Chronicle provided a detailed account of the formation of a
CAFGU company in Brooke's Point on Palawan island. 67 Brooke's Point
has seen little NPA activity, but the town and its AFP installations have
been harassed by rebels from the Muslim secessionist Moro National
Liberation Front. Most of the recruits interviewed for the story said they
were former members of the Bantay Bayan or teenagers who were no
longer attending school."1
For those at Brooke's Point, being a CAFGU was viewed as a status
symbol and the firearms with which they were entrusted were their
"symbol of authority." But the reason many joined tended to be more
mundane: few of the volunteers had permanent jobs and instead viewed
their militia duties as their only steady source of income. As a result of
underemployment in the area, the military had little trouble recruiting
enough people to fill the company. 69 Likewise, recruits in Mexico, Pam-
panga province, cited unemployment as a primary reason for joining the
newly-organized militia. "I don't have a job," said Melchor Sembillo,
21, "that's why I joined the CAFGUs." 7°
2. Screening
Screening procedures have largely been ineffectual in preventing un-
qualified individuals from joining CAFGU units. Among those accepted
into the CAFGUs by the military - sometimes over the objections of
civilian officials - have been neighborhood thugs, individuals with crim-
inal records and CHDF and vigilante group members with abusive back-
grounds. Some of these new militiamen have already been implicated in
human rights abuses.
Known ex-convicts, local toughs and "goons" of politicians have been
inducted into the CAFGU in a number of areas. After the killing of two
65. Interview by Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, in Catarman (Sept. 3, 1989).
66. CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, § 8.
67. See Mogato, War Just Another Job for These Fighters, MANILA CHRON., Feb. 12, 1989.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Inside the CAFGU, MANILA STANDARD, Nov. 21, 1988.
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peasant activists in Kalinga province on January 27, 1989 by CAFGU
militiamen, Representative William Claver called for the immediate halt
of the program in the province, stating that most of the recruits "tend
to be abusive and undisciplined."171 Fernando Delantar, who was among
those implicated in the June 16, 1989 murder of Andres Doncillo, 35, in
Cebu City, was accepted into the CAFGU although he was known locally
to have an abusive past. He had been implicated in but never arrested
for the 1986 burning of several houses in barangay Pardo, Cebu. In recent
years he was often seen carrying an M-16 assault rifle, and residents
believe he formerly was a Tadtad vigilante. A neighbor of Doncillo, whose
husband was himself threatened by Delantar on the day of the killing,
said of Delantar: "He was notorious, making threats with firearms, taking
shots and scaring the people."1
7 2
Official screening procedures have not prevented the induction of
many former and current vigilante group members into the CAFGU. The
fact of the poor human rights records of many vigilante groups urges
caution in the recruitment of ex-vigilantes, even when such individuals
have not personally been implicated in human rights abuses. Individuals
known to have carried unlicensed firearms as members of vigilante groups,
or engaged in other activities demonstrating a "derogatory record,"
7 3
should be prevented from serving in the CAFGU.
A more persistent problem is the recruitment of active vigilantes into
the CAFGU. In a number of areas, it was reported that many if not
most CAFGU militiamen are also members of vigilante groups. This
enables local military detachments to continue providing military weaponry
to vigilante groups, thereby lending support for vigilante activities. Visayas
Command Chief, Brig. Gen. Orlando Antonio, supports the induction of
vigilantes into the CAFGUs. He explains, "If they [vigilantes] become
CAFGU members, the military will have control over them." '7 4 In fact,
the result is that the vigilante groups gain greater firepower and legitimacy
at a time when the official policy is to dismantle them.
CAFGU membership has not been limited to the rank and file of the
vigilante groups, but has included some well-known vigilante leaders. The
head of Alsa Masa in Toledo City, Cebu, reportedly joined the CAFGU,
as did the Alsa Masa chairman in Laperla, Northern Samar. During a
71. MANILA BULL., Jan. 31, 1989; MANILA CHRON., Feb. 4, 1989.
72. Interview by Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, in Cebu City (Aug. 26, 1989).
73. See CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, § 7.
74. SUN STAR DAILY, May 5, 1989.
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visit to Negros Occidental, Baldomero Lopez, a leader of the vigilante
group Power Spirit-Alsa Masa and a CAFGU member, was seen in the
company of the Deputy Chief of Police of Himamaylan town and a
number of CAFGUs. Lopez is wanted for several counts of arson and
the August 9, 1987 murder of six members of the Basic Christian Com-
munities in Mahalang, Himamaylan. The bodies of the six had been found
covered with stab and hack wounds."
The military has adopted the practice of accepting former CHDF
members who are likely to be on NPA "hit lists" as a way of affording
them protection from retribution. 76 According to Gen. Calupig, who
confirmed this practice, those who fit this category are the CHDF mili-
tiamen who were "most effective in fighting the insurgents. ' 77 But it
would appear that this open-door policy will permit the wide acceptance
of the most abusive CHDF members into the CAFGU, who are also likely
to be on NPA hit lists, as well as those thought to be the most "effective"
soldiers. The danger of this policy is highlighted by the inability of the
government to bring criminal charges against CHDF members implicated
in past human rights abuses.
Former NPA insurgents, called "surrenderees," have commonly been
accepted into the CAFGU. For instance, a military officer in Cagayan
province testified before Congress that "most of the CAFGU in the army
have been rebel surrenderees and also CHDF. ' 78 This would appear to
be in violation of CAFGU regulations prohibiting membership to those
with "derogatory records, ' 79 and the AFP circular and CAFGU Primer,
which require recruits to be "of unquestionable loyalty to the Republic." 80
The rationale for the inclusion of rebel surrenderees, who often keep the
weapons they ostensibly surrendered, is that they need the protection
provided by CAFGU duty and that their knowledge of the local NPA
can be especially useful in military operations. Their deployment, however,
75. See VIGILANTES IN THE PHILIPPINES, supra note 3, at 50-51. Lopez was reportedly visiting
the police headquarters in August 1989 seeking an "amicable settlement" with the families of the
murder victims.
76. See U.S. DEP'T ST., supra note 4, at 8. See also Inside the CAFGU, MANIILA STANDARD,
Nov. 21, 1988, where this practice is described in Pampanga province.
77. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with Gen. Calupig, in Pagadian City
(Aug. 30, 1989).
78. Testimony of Brig. Gen. Pedro Sistoza, before the House Committees on Human Rights,
Local Government and National Defense, Mar. 14, 1989.
79. CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, at § 5.
80. CAFGU Primer, supra note 24, at § 8.
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raises serious concerns about their commitment to law and order and the
likelihood that they might use their weapons to settle vendettas.
3. Blanket Recruitment
The CAFGU regulations, containing qualifications and disqualifica-
tions for militia service, clearly envision a case-by-case screening of
applicants. Yet there have been many reports of the wholesale incorpo-
ration of certain groups into the CAFGU, particularly vigilante groups
and CHDF detachments. This is troubling not simply because the regular
screening procedures are being ignored, but also because the groups
absorbed into the CAFGU have poor human rights records.
The conversion of the Philippine Constabulary Forward Command
(PCFC) is the military's most open attempt to absorb a group into the
CAFGU. Its name notwithstanding, the PCFC is not a formal sub-unit
of the Philippine Constabulary, but a privately-supported armed vigilante
organization. It was created under the direction of PC provincial com-
mander Col. Miguel Coronel and with the financial support of sugar
planters in Negros.8
The military has pressed local governments to accept the en masse
recruitment of the PCFC into the Special CAFGU, where they receive
salaries from their private employers. In practice, the supervision of Special
CAFGUs lies with the employer and not the military. When questioned
about CAFGU discipline, one sugar planter told a journalist, "One grave
mistake, he's out. We are very harsh with abusive CAFGUs. We never
allow abuses to go unpunished." 82 By leaving discipline to the whims of
employers, the government has in effect ceded control over the militia to
the private sector.
The decision to "absorb" the PCFC into the CAFGU is especially
problematic in light of the group's poor human rights record. PCFC
members have been implicated in a number of serious abuses, particularly
against members and organizers of the militant National Federation of
Sugar Workers (NFSW).
C. Recruitment and Civilian Government Authority
Under the CAFGU regulations, local military commanders have final
authority to accept or reject an applicant to the CAFGU. Military officers,
81. See VIGILANTES IN THE PHILIPPINES, supra note 3, at 53-5.
82. MANILA STANDARD, Mar. 13, 1990.
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who are generally from outside the area and less aware of local issues,
may choose CAFGU members who are unacceptable to civilian officials.
Local government officials have expressed concern that they lack a real
say in CAFGU recruitment and thus have little control over the armed
men patrolling their streets. Military officials can recruit CAFGU members
beholden to them at the expense of civil authority.
According to the CAFGU regulations, city and municipal Peace and
Order Councils "shall be consulted in the screening of volunteers" to the
active CAFGU. a Consultation through local Peace and Order Councils,
which coordinate counter-insurgency and the anti-crime activities of the
military, police, civilian officials and the private sector, is the only formal
manner in which civilian officials can influence the recruitment process.
Military officials insist that final recruitment decisions must lie with
the local military commander in order to prevent CAFGUs from being
used by local politicians as their "private armies." According to military
Chief of Staff Manuel Cacanando, "In some areas, mayors insist on
putting in their own men, even those with criminal records. The com-
manders don't like that. '8 4 National Defense Secretary Ramos considered
the consultative role of the Peace and Order Councils in the screening of
recruits to be a demonstration of the principle of civilian supremacy, not
a derogation of it. 5
But a number of local officials disagree. In a meeting between Pres-
ident Aquino and mayors from throughout the country in March 1989,
several mayors voiced their concern over their lack of control over the
program. Mayor Tomas Osmena, the influential mayor of Cebu City,
said that the presence of CAFGUs in urban areas gave rise to rivalries
with local police forces. He urged that they be prevented from performing
the tasks of the police and that civilian officials have the authority to
disarm the CAFGUs.8 6
The personal relationship between military and civilian officials plays
a large part in settling recruitment disputes. With respect to recruiting,
says Gen. Cacanando, "there is what is called a compromise .... It's
not all the time that the mayor or the commander wins.""7 But the
arrangement places government officials who are reluctant to deploy
83. CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, § 12.
84. MANILA CHRON., Aug. 13, 1989.
85. MANILA BULL., Nov. 7, 1988.
86. MALAYA, Mar. 1, 1989.
87. MANILA CHRON., Aug. 13, 1989.
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CAFGUs at a serious disadvantage and can place great strains on their
ties to the local military. Since 1988, Mayor Ernesto Clarete of Plaridel,
Misamis Occidental province, has been accused by local military com-
manders of being an NPA supporter. He believes these accusations stem
from his unwillingness to organize a CAFGU detachment in Plaridel, the
only municipality in Misamis Occidental without one.
V. CAFGU Training
Military training is another factor that is intended to differentiate the
CAFGU from its predecessor, the CHDF. Officially, training for the
CHDF was provided by the Philippine Constabulary, but in practice it
was minimal and non-standardized. According to Amnesty International,
"only limited funds were made available by the armed forces for training
[the CHDF], and as the military's use of the CHDF expanded, local
'warlords' - often politicians or plantation owners - provided the funds
for uniforms and weapons, and occasionally for training as well.' '88 It
was not uncommon for CHDF recruits to be given weapons and hasty
instructions in their use, and then issued "mission orders" to defend their
community. The CAFGU militia is supposed to differ from the CHDF
because of the institution of a standardized training program.
A. Theory and Practice
The CAFGU regulations envision a force made up primarily of indi-
viduals with reservist training or who are ex-servicemen.8 9 Included in this
category are high school graduates who are assumed to have received
Citizen Military Training, a requirement in all Philippine high schools.
An exception to the general rule that CAFGU members are to be
trained reservists is "in areas where there is an insufficient number of
reservists."90 In those areas, the AFP will screen able-bodied male citizens
and train them under the AFP's CAFGU Training Program. Afterwards,
the trainees "shall be qualified as AFP Reservists and subsequently as
CAFGU Active Auxiliaries." 91 In practice, CAFGU units are organized
88. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNLAWFUL KILLINGS BY MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES 8
(1988).
89. CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, § 2(f).
90. Id. § 9.
91. Id.
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by company, so all recruits to a particular company are trained together,
including reservists and ex-servicemen. 92
CAFGU recruits do not receive the full training given to regular AFP
personnel. In the words of a CAFGU instructor in Pampanga, the CAFGU
training is "a very compressed, specialized version of the basic AFP
training." 93 The training period called for under the CAFGU Training
Program is five weeks or an equivalent of 250 hours. 94 However, this
period appears to vary considerably from area to area. For instance,
human rights monitors in Davao City believed that the training period
there for some recruits was only twenty days. In Cagayan province, new
recruits have received forty-five days of training.91
CAFGU recruits are not necessarily adequately trained for the weapons
they carry. While Chief of Staff Gen. Renato de Villa stated publicly that
CAFGUs were only authorized to carry M-1 Garand rifles and carbines, 96
CAFGUs have been issued high-powered assault rifles, such as M-14s and
M-16 armalites. CAFGU members in Cagayan province, who in March
1990 helped ex-Governor Rodolfo Aguinaldo resist arrest for rebellion,
had received various high-powered firearms, including anti-tank rifles,
light machine guns and rifle grenades.
One high-ranking military officer stated that CAFGUs did not receive
hand grenades. Yet there have been several occasions in which CAFGU
members have committed criminal acts with grenades. On August 19,
1989 in a remote barangay in Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur, three CAFGU
militiamen detailed with the 46th Infantry Battalion attended a late-night
disco. According to press accounts, after one refused to pay his bar bill,
he threw a grenade into the crowd, which exploded, killing ten people
and wounding fifty-five others. The men were initially arrested and
Defense Secretary Ramos reportedly relieved the military commander
responsible for the three. Six days later, however, the military released a
two-page initial report, clearing the three CAFGU members and hinting
that the NPA was behind the attack. While the report called for a more
thorough investigation by the civilian National Bureau of Investigation
92. The CAFGU regulations provide that reserve units are to receive training at least once
every two years, to maintain their proficiency and readiness status. This training is to concentrate
on combat and small-unit tactics and to improve command and staff skills. Id. § 9.
93. See Inside the CAFGU, MNA STANDARD, Nov. 22, 1988.
94. CAFGU PRMER, supra note 24, § 17.
95. MANILA CHRON., Mar. 18, 1990.
96. Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan broadcast, May 7, 1989, as reported in FBIS 42 (May 10,
1989).
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and the military's investigative agency, it nonetheless exonerated the
militiamen, concluding that they "have a strong alibi" and that "no one
saw the grenade thrower." 97
B. Compensation and Special CAFGUs
The CAFGU regulations do not provide for government salaries for
regular CAFGU members, who are considered volunteers. Those on Active
Auxiliary (combat) status receive the military's Basic Subsistence Allow-
ance for food. This allowance is currently set at 30 pesos ($1.20) a day
- 900 pesos ($36) a month. 8 In addition, CAFGU members receive
insurance, combat clothing, medical care for injuries and sickness incurred
in the line of duty, and burial services for death as a result of active duty
injuries.9 Some military commanders insist that CAFGU members have
a visible means of income in addition to the food allowance. 1°° This is
not a formal policy, however, nor is it necessarily followed in areas where
it is supposedly in force.
Lack of suitable pay has long been a source of problems for the
various militia forces in the Philippines. For funding local CHDF units,
the military commonly sought the support of private sources. This resulted
in the blurring of the distinction between what should have been a
government militia and what often proved to be a so-called private army.
According to Amnesty International, as the military's use of the CHDF
expanded, local landowners and businessmen played a greater role in
financing the militia: "The result was that in many areas, the CHDF
served the dual function of a paramilitary arm of the regular armed forces
and of a private army for locally powerful individuals."'' 1
In a similar fashion, local commanders have sought private support
for organizing CAFGU companies in their areas. For instance, the CAFGU
unit in Mexico, Pampanga, reportedly received money and supplies from
a wealthy physician and from a landowner who owns the rice fields in
the area. Said a CAFGU trainer, "There are several people who we
protect. And now they are supporting the CAFGU financially."' 0 2
97. See PIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 26, 1989.
98. National Budget for 1990, signed into law on Jan. 4, 1990, cited in MANIUA CHRON., Jan.
5, 1990.
99. CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, § 15.
100. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with Gen. (ret.) Jesus Hermosa, in Cebu
(Aug. 29, 1989).
101. AMnESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNLAWFUL KILLINGS, supra note 88, at 8.
102. See Inside the CAFGU, MANULA STANDARD, Nov. 22, 1988.
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This practice was initially an informal one, without open government
approval. In April 1989, the Department of National Defense formalized
the arrangement with the promulgation of guidelines for the so-called
Special CAFGU Active Auxiliary. The "Special CAFGU guidelines" set
out two reasons for instituting the Special CAFGU program. First, budg-
etary constraints purportedly prevented the AFP from filling the "security
vacuum" left by the phasing out of the CHDF. Second, the congressional
"budget cut" for the CAFGU program placed the number of recruits
below the level set out in the AFP's "campaign plan."' 3
The Special CAFGU guidelines allow business operations to employ
armed guards with the legal powers of CAFGU militiamen. The guidelines
provide that Special CAFGUs are to be utilized "principally for the
defense of business establishments" to deter the imposition of "taxes"
imposed by the NPA or the MNLF. 1 4 They are also to be used for
"security of vital facilities, intelligence collection, public information
drives and community development activities.' ' 0 The guidelines prohibit
Special CAFGUs from being used as "guides, 'cargadores' [porters],
personal security of VIP's and the like."' ° Since the guidelines are
promulgated by the Department of National Defense, it is the responsibility
of the armed forces to enforce them. However, no special mechanisms
are set out and it is not known to what extent they have been enforced.
Under the guidelines, Special CAFGU companies are authorized on a
"case-by-case" basis.1° Special CAFGUs must meet regular CAFGU
requirements and be employed by "duly accredited business establish-
ments." Furthermore, the Special CAFGU company must be "within the
paying jurisdiction of companies or institutions requesting for its activa-
tion." 10 Unlike the regulations for regular CAFGUs, no mention is made
of consultation by local Peace and Order Councils in the screening and
selecting of Special CAFGUs. Rather than being restricted to a specific
administrative area, the Special CAFGUs are limited to "within business
companies' territorial jurisdiction."'' 0°
103. DEPARTM1ENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GUIDELINES ON THE SPECIAL CAFGU AcTrvE AuxLARY
(Apr. 4, 1988). It should be noted that the "budget cut" was actually a congressional appropriation
lower than the funding level requested by the Aquino administration.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 14.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id. at 4.
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The significant distinguishing feature between Special and regular
CAFGUs is that the former receive pay from their employer instead of
the small AFP food allowance. The private employer supplies clothing,
equipment and other support, while weapons and ammunition are supplied
by the military. Special CAFGUs are still supposed to be "integrated with
the AFP units for operations." '" 0
The guidelines provide for certain safeguards. "In no instance will
Special CAFGUs be allowed to operate independently" from the local
security forces."' Furthermore, the Special CAFGUs are to be under the
command and control of an AFP unit and "not ... under the Chief
Security or Security Consultant of the company that is to be protected."" 2
Nevertheless, they remain company employees - the guidelines state that
the Special CAFGUs "are part-time soldiers. They receive pay and allow-
ances from the company institution that hired them, thus their employment
and utilization shall be made in a way that their routinary [sic] workload
shall not be impaired.""f1 3
Through the Special CAFGU program, the government is giving its
imprimatur to the private armies of politicians, large landowners and
business enterprises. Under the guise of acting on the public's behalf,
such forces carry out the agenda of private individuals. Private armies
have traditionally been the source of sustained and serious violence in the
Philippines. After hundreds of CAFGU members in Cagayan province
joined ex-Governor Aguinaldo in his confrontation with the government
in March 1990, Negros Occidental PC commander Col. Reynaldo Velasco
expressed concern about the "split loyalties" of the Special CAFGUs. " 4
In the past, the commingling of private security forces and government
military or paramilitary forces, either in the form of the CHDF or vigilante
groups, has resulted in gross violations of human rights, including killings,
"disappearances" and torture."'
Various business interests, which may be the targets of NPA attack,
have been implicated in politically-motivated violence against social activ-
ists, especially labor and peasant organizers. Through the Special CAFGU
program, the government has in effect taken sides in labor disputes and
land issues, and must assume responsibility for the resulting human rights
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id. at 10.
114. MALAYA, Apr. 2, 1990.
115. See, e.g., Vion.ANTEs iN THE PHmPPiNES, supra note 3, at 132-33.
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violations. Since January 1989, the National Federation of Sugar Workers
has reported five murders of union members, including two local presi-
dents, by persons alleged to be CAFGU members.11 6
Through the Special CAFGU program, the Philippine government has
given its official approval, as well as weapons and training, to units that
may act as the private armies of their patrons. In defense of absorbing
the PCFC into the CAFGU, Lt. Merced of the 331st PC company told
the Bacolod City Council that paying CAFGUs through private sources
would actually reduce the number of private armies: "Now you may be
able to see that there are individuals having a bodyguard of PCFC. But
once these are integrated into the CAFGU they will cease to be there...
because we might be violating the strict rule of a CAFGU." 7 In fact,
paying CAFGUs through private sources merely legitimizes the private
armies.
In March 1990, in an apparent change of position, Defense Secretary
Ramos responded to concerns about the Special CAFGU in Negros
Occidental. He ordered the local military to disarm all CAFGU companies
being used by sugar planters as private armies and examine the Special
CAFGU program. Said Ramos: "We cannot allow anymore the organi-
zation of self-defense units that is [sic] not tied up with the military. If
we don't control this practice, then, we might as well be a large security
agency.""' In April, the Negros Occidental PC provincial commander,
Col. Reynaldo Velasco, reiterated that there would be a crackdown on
landlord-controlled CAFGUs so they would not develop into the same
"monsters" as the CAFGU became in Cagayan province."19 Since then,
there has been a significant reduction in the deployment of Special
CAFGUs in Negros Occidental.
VI. Supervision of CAFGUs
According to the CAFGU regulations, the Philippine military has
supervisory responsibility for all CAFGU units and personnel. There have
been many instances where the military has been grossly negligent in its
supervision of CAFGUs. There has been a pattern of serious abuse
involving regular military and CAFGU personnel operating together,
indicating that abusive commanders have been put in charge of CAFGU
116. NFSW-FGT, The Workers' Voice, Bacolod City, 9 (Oct 15 - Nov. 15, 1989).
117. Minutes of Sangguniang Panlungsod, Bacolod City, 10 (May 11, 1989).
118. MANILA STANDARD, Mar. 12, 1990.
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forces and have directed them to participate in human rights violations.
CAFGU members operating alone, without the required military control,
also have engaged in numerous acts of violence that appear to be politically
motivated. Finally, there are many instances where CAFGU members
operating alongside vigilante groups, perhaps as members, have committed
serious abuses, including murder, beheading and mutilation.
A. The Regulations on Supervision
The executive order establishing the CAFGU calls for militiamen "to
serve with the regular troops as part of the standing force." 20 The CAFGU
regulations expand upon this basic directive: "All CAFGU Active Auxi-
liaries (CAAs) shall be attached to a regular AFP formation in the active
force which shall exercise control and supervision over the CAAs con-
cerned as may be prescribed by the Chief of Staff, AFP.' 2' In the field,
each company of 88 CAFGUs is to be under the command and control
of an army officer and 12 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men
from the regular military. 22 The CAFGU Primer provides that these
military personnel, called "CAFGU cadres," are to receive four weeks of
special training. 123
The regulations permit wide-ranging roles for the CAFGUs. They may
be called upon to give assistance during natural calamities, such as
typhoons and fires, or in the case of a war against a foreign power or
other national emergency. 24 In "insurgency-affected areas," CAFGUs
may be called upon "to complement AFP regular units.' 1 25 Area com-
manders or other appropriate military commanders are to have "primary
responsibility" in the administration, supervision and utilization of CAFGU
members. 126
Civilian officials have recognized the importance of adequate super-
vision of the militia force. For instance, Vice Governor Cascolluela of
Negros Occidental, a supporter of the CAFGU program, said, "It is quite
120. Exec. Order No. 264, "Providing for a Citizen Armed Force," (July 25, 1987).
121. CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, § 5.
122. See, e.g., testimony of Col. Sierra before the House Committees on Human Rights, Local
Government and National Defense, Mar. 14, 1990.
123. CAFGU PRIMER, supra note 24, §§ 17-18.
124. CAFGU REGULATIONS, supra note 22, § 6.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 8. As part of the administration of the CAFGUs, military units must keep a file on
all CAFGU reservists and a monthly roster of militiamen to be forwarded to the AFP headquarters
in Manila. Id.
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obvious, the more CAFGUs that are recruited, the more chance of finding
undesirables among them. They need to be strictly controlled. 1' 27 Other
local civilian officials expressed concern that unaccompanied CAFGUs
would cause problems in their municipalities.121
B. Abuses While Under Military Supervision
As the U.S. State Department concludes in a 1989 report to the U.S.
Congress, "the ability of the Government to implement policies designed
to ensure full respect for human rights by the CAFGUs will largely depend
upon the Government's ability to successfully fulfill these screening,
training and control functions."' 29 There have been numerous credible
reports of human rights violations by CAFGU members acting under
military supervision. This raises serious questions as to the standards set
for military personnel being put in charge of CAFGU units. CAFGU
members, generally far less trained and experienced than their regular
military counterparts, require commanders who are especially attentive to
human rights concerns.
Whether CAFGU militiamen respect basic human rights depends in
great measure on the leadership of supervisory military personnel. Because
CAFGUs are not professional soldiers, but part-time soldiers with only
minimal training, the demands on military commanders are even greater
than they would be with regular troops. The preceding cases raise serious
questions regarding the human rights records of regular military personnel
placed in command of CAFGUs. This responsibility extends to local
military officials and, ultimately, to the military high command and the
Philippine government.
C. Inadequate Military Supervision
Most cases of serious CAFGU abuse concern militiamen operating
without direct military supervision. That armed CAFGUs are able to
operate in this manner reflects both problems inherent in the formal
CAFGU structure and inadequate command control by regular military
personnel. Politically-motivated acts of violence suggest possible complicity
by the military in such attacks.
127. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with Lito Cascolluela, Vice Governor of
Negros Occidental, in Bacolod (Aug. 13, 1989).
128. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with Mayor Tomas Osmena, in Cebu
(Aug. 28, 1989).
129. U.S. DEP'T ST, supra note 4, at 12.
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CAFGU members are licensed to carry military weapons and they do
so, even when they are not acting under direct military supervision. Unlike
the regular soldier, whose job is full-time and who generally lives at a
military camp, the CAFGU member typically works part-time and lives
at home. As a consequence, a large percentage of a CAFGU company
will always be off-duty. The CAFGU regulations are silent on whether
militiamen must leave their firearms with the detachment when they go
off-duty. The AFP strategy of using militiamen as a static and often
unsupported barrio defense emphasizes quick access to their weapons,
even when off-duty. Military officers also contend that CAFGUs need to
take their weapons home because their service makes them a more likely
target of an NPA attack. 30 Although a military officer stated that the
local practice was to have off-duty CAFGUs turn in their weapons, there
is no evidence to suggest that this is a consistent requirement.
The result is that off-duty militiamen are armed with military weaponry
without military supervision, contravening the intent, if not the letter, of
Executive Order No. 264 and the CAFGU regulations. In Bacolod City,
a military officer tried to assuage civilian officials who were troubled by
this possibility: "I am inviting each and every citizen," he told them, "if
you see them [CAFGUs] ... moonlighting with the firearm, kindly call
us in my office and then I will personally apprehend him."'' This
statement betrays greater awareness of the problem than it does of a
useful solution.
There are a number of reported cases of human rights abuse in which
groups of vigilantes and CAFGU militiamen have operated together. In
specific cases, it could not be determined whether the participating CAFGU
members were also members of the vigilante groups. Gen. (ret.) Jesus
Hermosa stated that CAFGUs are not permitted to be members of vigilante
groups. He said that in Cebu this had occurred only in "isolated cases. '"1
However, neither the CAFGU regulations nor the Primer provide any
discussion of joint membership in the CAFGU and civilian volunteer
organizations.
In a number of areas of the country, local human rights monitors
reported that it was very common for CAFGU members to simultaneously
130. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with Gen. Ernesto Calupig, in Pagadian
City (Aug. 30, 1989).
131. Minutes of Sangguniang Panlungsod, Bacolod City, 7 (May 11, 1989).
132. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview with Gen. (ret.) Jesus Hermosa, in Cebu
(Aug. 29, 1989).
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be members of vigilante groups.' In Davao City early in 1989, military
checkpoints were being manned by combined teams of Alsa Masa and
the CAFGUs. As a result of reports of harassment, AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Renato de Villa in April 1989 ordered both the CAFGU and Alsa
Masa off of the checkpoints and replaced them with elite Scout Ranger
personnel; the complaints dropped dramatically. 3 4
Local military officials are using the formation of CAFGUs to provide
military weaponry to vigilante groups. Blurring the distinction between
vigilantes and CAFGUs undermines the ostensible structure of the militia
to be part of, rather than separate from, the regular army. It also raises
doubts about expressed government commitment to disband the vigilante
groups.
D. Attacks on Members of Social Activist Groups
Many human rights violations by military and paramilitary personnel
have been directed against members of social activist groups that have
been dubbed communist-front organizations by the Philippine military
and some government officials. These include labor and peasant organ-
izers, student activists, church clergy and lay workers, human rights
monitors, lawyers and health workers. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional, "dozens of activists involved in lawful non-governmental organi-
zations" "disappeared" or were killed in 1989.1'" Others have been
tortured in detention or held for long periods without trial. Many more
have received death threats, been harassed or have been placed under
military surveillance.
In 1989, military and paramilitary personnel were implicated in the
killing of four Roman Catholic priests and Protestant ministers. 3 6 Since
October 1987, six human rights lawyers have been killed under circum-
stances that to varying degrees suggest military involvement.137 Many more
have received serious threats. For instance, on May 22, 1990, Solema
133. However, only a small percentage of vigilante groups members are also members of the
CAFGU.
134. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview, in Davao City (Aug. 10, 1989).
135. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE PHn.IPPINES: A SuMMARY OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S
CONCERNS (May 1990).
136. Those killed were Rev. Amando Anosa, UCCP, in Samar; Rev. Zenaido Ruelo, UCCP,
in Zamboanga del Sur; Fr. Dionisio Malalay, in Zamboanga del Sur; and Rev. Vizminda Gran,
UCCP, in Misamis Occidental.
137. See generally, LAwYERs COMMIT EE FOR HumAN RIGHTS & ASIA WATCH, LAWYERS UNDER
FIRE (1988).
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Jubilan, a human rights lawyer in Kidapawan, North Cotabato province,
received five separate anonymous phone calls in which she and her family
were threatened with death. One caller reportedly said, "The Jubilans will
be finished - their end is near - first Sol Jubilan." Prior to these
threats, on May 12, 1990, the Mindanao Cross newspaper published an
account in which an unnamed "Philippine Constabulary Major based in
Cotabato province" alleged that an orphanage run by Jubilan was a front
for fund-raising activities of the NPA and that some orphans were made
to undergo guerrilla training. 3 '
Like soldiers and vigilantes, CAFGUs have also engaged in a pattern
of attacks against members of social activist groups. In late April 1989,
CAFGU members under the supervision of the 301st Infantry Battalion
in Negros Occidental and local vigilantes began distributing two "hit lists"
naming twenty-four people as communist supporters or members of the
NPA. Among those listed were eight priests, including the Emeritus Bishop
of Bacolod Antonio Fortich, six nuns and lay church workers, three
human rights lawyers, three radio broadcasters, and three labor leaders.
One of the lists was signed by the Masa Kontra Komunista ("Masses
Against Communists"), an organization of which local human rights
monitors were not aware. The commander of the 301st Infantry Battalion
took no action to halt the distribution of the hit lists. Some of the
individuals listed contend that information on the lists could not have
been obtained without the knowledge of military intelligence units.'39
VII. Conclusion
The Philippine government initiated the CAFGU program in 1988
with ready knowledge of the rampant human rights abuses committed by
its predecessor, the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF). Regulations
regarding recruitment, screening, training and supervision of militia mem-
bers reflected an understanding of the problems posed by a militia force
operating in the context of counter-insurgency operations.
Yet, despite official regulations and government assurances, the CAF-
GUs have committed serious and widespread human rights abuses against
suspected NPA supporters and others. The recruitment and screening-in
of unqualified and abusive personnel, including former members of the
CHDF and the NPA, have undermined the creation of a law-abiding
138. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE HARASSMENT AND PERSECUTION OF JUDGES
AND LAWYERS 65 (1990).
139. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interviews, in Bacolod City (Aug. 12-13, 1989).
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militia force. CAFGU training has not adequately prepared recruits for
the very difficult problems faced in counter-insurgency situations, and has
made abuses inevitable. Current deployment of CAFGU personnel in areas
where the NPA is active without adequate supervision by regular military
forces has resulted in numerous human rights violations. All of these
problems have been exacerbated by the close ties often existing between
CAFGU members and local vigilante groups.
The Philippine military has sought to distance itself from the criminal
actions of the CAFGUs in the field. This is reflected by the general
unwillingness of the military to facilitate government investigations of
human rights offenses by CAFGU personnel. And while plans are under-
way to expand the CAFGU force, little attention has been given to
addressing the problems the force has created. If the Philippine govern-
ment is to meet its obligations under international human rights law,
exerting control over the CAFGUs and accepting responsibility for their
actions are essential.

